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In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court will soon consider whether to overrule 
a significant administrative law doctrine governing a standard of judicial review 
in which a reviewing court grants deference to an agency’s reasonable, although 
not necessarily best, interpretation of one of its own regulations.2 The Court 
should, instead, consider replacing the administrative law doctrine, Auer 
deference, with Seminole Rock deference.3 However, the deference doctrines  
                                                          
* John B. Meisel, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Southern Illinois University 
Edwardsville.The author wishes to thank the editors and the staff of the Catholic University 
Journal of Law and Technology for their excellent editorial assistance. 
 
1 The title is adapted from the widely-cited article: Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long 
Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015). 
 2 Kisor v. Wilkie, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 6439837 
(Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15) (On granting certiorari to reconsider overruling judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations). 
 3 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) (establishing the Auer doctrine); 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (establishing that using 
binding deference to hold that when a case “involves an interpretation of an administrative 
regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation 
if the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution 
in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various 
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are commonly used interchangeably.4 Indeed, in some ways, the 21st  century 
application of Auer deference, by incorporating a number of limitations on 
binding deference, is better aligned with the original understanding and 
application of Seminole Rock deference established in 1945.5 This is a step in 
the correct direction. Notwithstanding this doctrinal improvement, the Supreme 
Court has the opportunity to return the deference standard to its original 
meaning, a form of deference much less generous to agency regulatory 
interpretations while ensuring that a reviewing court has the final authority to 
determine the legal commands an agency is instructed to follow, whether by 
statute or in its own regulation. 
There is growing dissatisfaction with deference doctrines in general, however 
particularly with Auer deference.6 The legal community was surprised by the 
late Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell 
Telephone Co., in which he first criticized Auer deference, despite the fact that 
Justice Scalia originally authored the opinion in Auer v. Robbins, which 
entrenched the modern version of Auer deference granting generous deference 
to agency interpretations of their own regulations.7 Apparently, Justice Scalia 
was persuaded that judicial deference was no longer justified, in part, since it 
violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers.8 In Perez v. 
Mortgage Bankers Association, each of the concurrences expressed great 
skepticism for the Court’s practice of granting generous deference to regulatory 
interpretations.9 However, a majority of the Justices remained confident that 
there remains sufficient judicial control over agency regulatory interpretations 
                                                          
interpretations, but the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes 
of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”). 
 4 Kiser v. Wilkie, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 6439837 
(Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15) (granting certiorari limited to the first question as to whether 
the Supreme Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., which directs courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own 
ambiguous regulation.). 
 5 The Seminole Rock deference states that “the ultimate criterion is the administrative 
interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.” Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
 6 Daniel Waters, The Empty Case for Overruling Auer Deference, THE REG. REV. (Dec. 
11, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/12/11/walters-empty-case-overruling-auer-
deference; see also Aaron Nelson et al., Reflections on Seminole Rock: The Past, Present, 
and Future of Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, YALE J. OF REG. AND THE 
AM. B. ASS’N SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REG. PRAC. at 11, 20, 26 (2017) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847668. 
 7 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67-68 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., Concurring). 
 8 Id. at 68. 
 9 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-11, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
Alito, J., and Thomas, J., concurring). 
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notwithstanding Auer deference.10 
It has been speculated that the interest in reexamining Auer deference was on 
the wane due to the death of Justice Scalia11 and the Court’s denial of certiorari 
to review Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., where the district court relied 
on Auer deference.12 However, with the appointment of two new Justices, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and the granting of certiorari in 
Kisor v. Wilkie, interest in examining Auer deference is rekindled.13 Both of 
these new Justices have authored scholarship and opinions indicating concern 
about the constitutionality of judicial reliance on deference doctrines.14 
Part I of this Comment will present the theoretical model granting binding 
deference to an agency’s statutory interpretations. This part will focus on the 
assumptions that underlie the model and identifies the merits of an emerging 
restriction on a grant of binding deference regarding the kinds of arguments an 
agency uses to justify its interpretive choice. Part II presents the model granting 
binding deference to an agency’s regulatory interpretations. It will show that 
although this model is considered to be a rather simple extension of the statutory 
interpretation model, such an extension has no theoretical justification. It is 
critically important for a theoretical model underlying a deference doctrine to 
distinguish cases in which an agency purports to make new law in a gap in a 
legal text from those in which the agency is merely clarifying the inherent 
meaning of a static text. Finally, Part III argues how the Court’s treatment of 
agency regulatory interpretations in the seminal regulatory interpretation case, 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., is the proper model for judicial review of 
an agency regulatory interpretation. This part will emphasize that the Seminole 
Rock model of deference is fundamentally different from the premises 
underlying Auer deference. 
                                                          
 10 Id. 1225 n.4 (arguing that “[e]ven in cases where an agency’s interpretation receives 
Auer deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given 
interpretation means what the agency says it means. Moreover, Auer deference is not an 
inexorable command in all cases.”). 
 11 Kevin O. Leske, A Rock Unturned: Justice Scalia’s (Unfinished) Crusade Against the 
Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017). 
 12 Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016). 
 13 Kisor v. Wilkie, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 6439837 
(Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15); see also Walters, supra note 6, at 116-17. 
 14 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
2134-44 (2016) (suggesting a new approach to determine whether the text of a statute is 
clear which if implemented would impose a new limit on Chevron deference); see also 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(arguing Chevron deference requires a court to relinquish its constitutional power to say 
“what the law is” to an agency’s (reasonable) statutory interpretation). 
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I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AS A MODEL FOR AUER DEFERENCE. 
A. Chevron Framework as Promulgated by the Supreme Court 
Auer deference, which concerns judicial review of agency regulatory 
interpretations, is applied and justified in many ways similar to judicial review 
of agency statutory interpretations. It is important first to understand the 
administrative law and key assumptions underlying judicial review of agency 
interpretations of statutory language before turning to the modern understanding 
of Auer deference. The landmark Supreme Court case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. provides the foundation and initial 
theoretical background and justifications for binding deference to agency 
statutory interpretations.15 The Chevron theoretical framework contains two 
procedural steps. First, it is the court’s responsibility to determine if the statute 
provided an unambiguous answer to the precise question at issue. For instance, 
in the Chevron case, the question at issue was whether the statute clearly defined 
the term ‘stationary source.’16 If, as in the Chevron case, the reviewing court 
concludes Congress did not provide a clear answer, the statute (more 
specifically, the term ‘stationary source’) was determined to be ambiguous.17 A 
statute is deemed ambiguous if there is a gap or hole in the statute, or the statute 
is silent regarding the specific question at issue.18 
Given a finding of ambiguity (which implicitly captures silence in the statute 
as well), court review moves beyond step one.19 The second prong presumes 
Congress delegated the authority to resolve the statutory ambiguity to the 
administering agency as long as the court determined that the agency’s statutory 
interpretive choice was reasonable.20 The Chevron decision specifically stated: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which 
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is 
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the 
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
                                                          
 15 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 16 Id. at 840. 
 17 Id. at 843. 
 18 Id. at 843-44. 
 19 As described below, as the Chevron framework evolved, the reviewing court, before 
moving to step two, holds ultimate power to determine whether there has been an implicit 
delegation of interpretive power by Congress to the agency. Id. at 843-44. 
 20 Id. 
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question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of 
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.21    
 
 Under the Chevron framework, the key distinction is to determine whether 
the source of the law derives from Congress or from the agency before the court 
may decide how to allocate interpretive power.22 The Court has ultimate 
interpretive power to discern the congressional intent written into the statute.23  
While the agency can be an interpretive aid to help the Court identify 
congressionally-made decisions, the ultimate interpretive authority resides with 
the court.24 Accordingly, if the Court does not surpass Chevron step one, then 
an agency does not possess binding interpretive authority regarding a decision 
that Congress has already made in the statute.25 
In step two of the Chevron analysis, when Congress has not made specific 
statutory law on the precise question at issue (as it did not in the Chevron case 
with respect to the definition of ‘stationary source’), the agency is delegated the 
responsibility to supply the law. The agency will typically provide the law in the 
form of a statutory interpretation embodied in a policy regulation to fill the 
statutory gap.26 Although, the restrictive language in Chevron step one requires 
Congress to provide the answer to the precise question at issue, the reviewing 
court may circumvent a statutory command if it is not easily discernable, which 
facilitates an analysis under Chevron step two, transferring interpretive power to 
an agency.27 This has led to a fundamental concern with the use of Chevron 
                                                          
 21 Id. at 842-43. 
 22 See id. at 842, 844, 865-66. 
 23 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); 
Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 175, 180 (2014). 
 24 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). 
 25 Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking 
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 200-01, 232 (1992) (stating “Congress never implicitly 
delegated the authority to make binding interpretations of what Congress had in mind; that 
interpretive task remains for the courts. Congress does and can delegate the authority to 
make binding rules where it has not made them. That legislative task must be left to the 
agencies.”); An exception to this principle is if Congress expressly delegated in the statute 
binding interpretive authority to an agency. See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: 
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 192-93 
(1992). 
 26 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
 27 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 460 (1989) (stating “Chevron’s language so 
narrowly circumscribed the judicial function in statutory interpretation that it was difficult, 
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deference in that an agency could gain lawmaking power to decide what the law 
is. This is especially problematic when Congress has already created the law on 
the question at issue,28 although not in a precise fashion.29 
If Congress had decided the question at issue (and it will be argued that a 
congressionally-made decision should not be limited to resolving only precisely 
expressed commands), ultimate interpretive power stays with the reviewing 
court. The agency’s statutory interpretation only serves as an input into the 
court’s responsibility to produce a statutory interpretation.30 The reviewing court 
retains responsibility to discern the congressional decision, even in the case of 
ambiguity, but not indeterminateness, in the statute.31 Otherwise, in such a case, 
the move to step two was incorrect. In short, courts retain binding interpretive 
power to resolve questions of law that can be resolved by legal analysis, whereas 
agencies have delegated binding control over questions of policy that can be 
resolved using legislative-type skills.32 As well as understanding the nature of 
the skill required to resolve an interpretive question, there are other implications 
of the Chevron framework which can be instructive for the subsequent 
examination of theoretical and practical problems with modern Auer deference. 
B. Evolution of Chevron Deference into the Auer Deference 
It is appropriate and necessary that a doctrine that grants binding deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute is grounded in a legal explanation because 
binding deference to an agency’s interpretation “marks a departure from the 
                                                          
at first, to believe Justice Steven’s opinion could be taken literally. Deference, Chevron 
seems to say, means accepting any rational meaning the agency chooses to assign to the 
statute unless the court can find not only that Congress had addressed “the precise question 
at issue,” but also that it had spoken “directly,” to provide a “clear,” “unambiguously 
expressed” answer.”). 
 28 Bob Goodlatte, Presidential power grabs distort democracy: Goodlatte, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/01/presidential-power-
grabs-executive-overreach-distort-democracy-congress-should-stop-goodlatte/79643162. 
 29 It is common to refer to the power transferred to an agency when Congress has not 
made law as interpretive power. It is more appropriate to refer to the kind of power 
transferred to the agency as lawmaking power since an agency is acting as a delegate of 
Congress to perform a legislative task, with the court retaining interpretive power which is a 
judicial duty to elucidate decisions that Congress has already made in the statute. Jonathan 
R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 963-65 
(2018) (explaining the distinction between interpretive power and lawmaking power). 
 30 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44; David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis 
of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 336 (2000). 
 31 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
 32 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1224 (2015); Hasen, supra note 30, 
at 332-33. 
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courts’ normal approach to resolving questions of statutory meaning.”33 That is, 
“[o]rdinarily, to decide a case when an agency is not in the picture, a court would 
seek to give its own best interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”34 The 
theoretical framework that supplies the legitimacy and rationales for the 
Chevron framework has been the subject of continuous critical discussion and 
improvement. 
In general, a theoretical model is built on a set of assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that Congress possesses the legal authority to allocate discretionary 
authority to create law when a statute is ambiguous or silent either to an 
administrative agency under the executive branch, or an Article III federal 
court.35 However, if the objective of an interpretation of a statute is to discern 
law that Congress has already made, the reviewing court possesses ultimate 
interpretive authority. 
Second, Congress is assumed to delegate lawmaking power to an agency to 
resolve statutory ambiguity.36 The decision to identify an administrative agency 
as the entity with authority to resolve statutory ambiguity is based on a 
conception of the term “interpretation” meaning that resolution of statutory 
ambiguity requires the congressional delegate to fill gaps through public 
policy.37 When a term or phrase in a statute is deemed ambiguous, it is the 
responsibility of the administrative agency to promulgate the law.38 
An agency is comparatively superior in two ways to a court in making policy 
decisions, which become regulatory law, equal in force to statutory law.39 First, 
an agency possesses superior subject matter expertise. An agency can draw on 
                                                          
 33 Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. L. REV. 1339, 1382 (2017). 
 34 Id. at 1347. 
 35 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, GEO. L.J., (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15) 
(available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225880) (explaining that it is conventional 
legal analysis that whether courts should defer to agency interpretations of law is a question 
for Congress to decide (subject to constitutional limitations)). 
 36 Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1996) (explaining Chevron deference is 
based on “a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for 
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and 
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever 
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”). 
 37 Jeff Pojanowski, Showdown in the Supreme Court over Administrative 
Interpretations of Regulations, YALE J. ON REG. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://yalejreg.com/ 
showdown-in-the-supreme-court-over-administrative-interpretations-of-regulations-by-jeff-
pojanowski/ (“A major premise governing contemporary judicial review of agency 
interpretations is that the line between interpretation and lawmaking is often illusory. That, 
much administrative law and scholarship tells us, is why we have Chevron deference when 
statutes are unclear: an interpreter makes law in statutory gaps and agencies should make 
these policy choices, not courts.”). 
 38 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 39 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles 
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 14 (2005). 
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the expertise of engineers, economists, public policy experts, lawyers, and other 
staff trained in specialized policymaking fields within the administrative agency 
to conduct rigorous analytical studies of alternative policy solutions to the 
problems specifically or generally identified by Congress in the statute but for 
which Congress, for various reasons, did not resolve.40 
Secondly, an agency is located in a politically accountable branch of 
government that is structured in a manner to be responsive to the demands of the 
public and, especially, the President. This ties Chevron’s decision regarding the 
allocation of interpretive authority to make policy decisions to the democratic 
principle that policy decisions should reside with the politically accountable 
branches of government.41 These “considerations [reasons], however, cannot 
provide independent legal justifications for Chevron deference as much as they 
reinforce the wisdom of judicial recognition in appropriate circumstances of an 
implicit delegation to ‘the agency charged with the administration of the 
statute.’”42 In short, the most cogent justification for Chevron deference is based 
on an assumption that it is a command from Congress.43 
Under the Chevron framework, the reviewing court retains three forms of 
interpretive power in the sense of ultimate responsibility for discerning the 
decisions that Congress did make in the statute. First, in step one of the Chevron 
analysis, courts retain ultimate power to decide if Congress clearly resolved the 
precise statutory question at issue.44 Second, if the statute is deemed ambiguous, 
                                                          
 40 Id. at 14 (quoting Mr. Elliott, who drew on his experience as EPA General Counsel 
starting in 1989, to provide real world evidence for how Chevron caused changes in the 
dynamics inside agencies as saying “[o]ne result of the Chevron induced shift of power to 
agencies within the Executive Branch, as mentioned earlier, is that agency experts are 
making more policy decisions rather than agency lawyers and federal courts.”). 
 41 This principle also means that when Congress did make a policy decision in the 
statute, that instruction must be followed and not usurped by an agency’s decision. 
 42 Coglianese, supra note 33, at 1348 n. 42 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)). 
 43 This article accepts the correctness of this assumption but recognizes that there are 
compelling arguments that question the constitutional basis of the assumption. For example, 
Farina, argues that Chevron deference is “fundamentally incongruous” with the 
constitutional accommodation that permitted the delegation of legislative power to agencies. 
In return for allowing such delegations, the power to say what the statute means must rest 
with the courts. Thus, Chevron deference is at odds with the nondelegation doctrine. Farina, 
supra note 27, at 498; Among others, Justice Thomas, argues that Chevron deference is a 
violation of Article III because courts are assigned the power to say what the law is, or 
interpretive power. As is explained below, the type of power that Congress delegates to an 
agency is lawmaking power, not purely interpretive power. Justice Thomas’ contention 
would be supported if, instead, agencies exercised delegated lawmaking power to merely 
explain what Congress had already decided in the statute. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 44 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 842-43 (1984). 
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the court also retains ultimate power at step two of the Chevron analysis, to 
determine the set of interpretations that would satisfy the requirement of a 
reasonable interpretation.45 Third, as the Chevron framework matured, it became 
clear that not all agency interpretations are eligible for deference.46 That is, 
statutory ambiguity is a necessary condition to move to Chevron step two, but it 
is not a sufficient condition.47 Given an ambiguity in the statutory provision at 
issue, the reviewing court retains ultimate authority to determine if Congress 
implicitly delegated lawmaking power to the agency.48 In essence, the court 
must decide if a move to a step two analysis where the agency holds categorical 
lawmaking power is the appropriate step to resolve the specific ambiguity at 
issue. 
The Court has identified several requirements as to whether the agency has 
been delegated lawmaking power implicitly to resolve the statutory ambiguity 
at issue. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court held that when an agency has 
been delegated lawmaking power and has exercised that power when it 
                                                          
 45 The set of reasonable interpretations has been described, according to a prominent 
administrative law scholar, as Chevron space. Strauss contends “‘Chevron space’ denotes 
the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a 
manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—-that is, its legally delegated or 
allocated authority.” The agency is free to select from among the reasonable interpretations 
and, if factual or political circumstances change, to change from one reasonable 
interpretation to another. Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them 
Chevron Space and Skidmore Weight, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012). 
 46 Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First 
Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. OF CHI. L. 
REV. 447, 476 n.165 (2013); Two types of deference, categorical and epistemological, are 
implicated in the article. An agency interpretation is granted categorical deference (in the 
text, also, called binding or ultimate deference) if the reviewing court must accept the 
agency interpretation if the court determines it to be reasonable even if the court would have 
chosen a different interpretation if it instead held ultimate authority. An agency 
interpretation is granted epistemological deference (commonly referred to as Skidmore 
deference) if the reviewing court finds the agency’s interpretation to be persuasive and 
adopts the agency interpretation as its own. Persuasiveness is considered a more demanding 
standard of judicial review than reasonableness. If a court is using the Skidmore standard of 
review, the court holds ultimate interpretive power. At Chevron step one, the court can grant 
epistemological deference to an agency interpretation, but the court holds ultimate 
interpretive power. At Chevron step two, the agency holds binding interpretive/lawmaking 
power if the interpretive choice lies in Chevron space. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 47 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S at 842-43. 
 48 Hubbard, supra note 46, at 457. The stage in which a reviewing court determines if 
the agency has been delegated implicitly lawmaking power is an interstitial step. According 
to Coglianese, the Chevron framework conceives of this decision as occurring after the 
court’s step one decision regarding ambiguity, and before the step two decision to consider 
granting categorical deference to the agency’s statutory interpretation. Coglianese, supra 
note 33, at 1361-62. Other scholars refer to these interstitial decisions as occurring at 
Chevron step zero. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 
89 GEO. L.J. 833, 837 (2001). 
82 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 27.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
formulated its statutory interpretation, the interpretation has the legal force of a 
statute and should be granted categorical deference.49 Accordingly, if Congress 
intends for an agency to make law to fill gaps in a statute, Congress must first 
delegate the lawmaking power to the agency. The agency then must have 
exercised that power to make law, in a fashion that exhibits fairness and 
deliberation as does the manner in which Congress exercises its lawmaking 
power.50 Unfortunately, the Mead decision failed to clarify when the Court 
should find an implicit congressional delegation of lawmaking power.51 
The Court has identified other circumstances in which an implicit delegation 
of lawmaking power should not be inferred from mere ambiguity in a statute.52 
These examples represent circumstances when it seems unlikely that Congress 
intended to delegate lawmaking power to an agency to make law by resolving a 
statutory ambiguity. For instance, in King v Burwell,53 the Court did not find an 
implicit delegation for two reasons, even though the Court determined the 
statutory provision at issue was determined to be ambiguous and the agency had 
utilized the notice-and-comment rulemaking process to produce the statutory 
interpretation. First, the statutory question at issue was considered to be too 
important in the sense of implicating significant social and economic effects to 
be left for resolution by an agency without an express delegation from 
                                                          
 49 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 S. Ct. 218, 226-27 (2000) (A court should move to 
step two “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”). 
 50 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230; Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843. 
 51 See Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of 
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1040 (2005) (“[T]he case did send a clear signal that the Court 
expects that interpretations produced through either notice-and-comment or formal 
adjudication will typically enjoy the “force of law.”“); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 
222 (2002) (showing how only one year elapsed before the Court granted categorical 
deference to an agency’s informally produced statutory interpretation explaining that its 
longstanding status served as an independent ground for such deference); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1443, 1477-78 (2005) (arguing that Mead created confusion among the lower courts in their 
efforts to ascertain the circumstances in which Congress intended to implicitly delegate 
lawmaking power to agencies). 
 52 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); Hasen, 
supra note 30, at 350 n.113; see, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers v. U.S. Dept. of 
Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 888 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating how the petitioner reading a single word 
in isolation ignores the whole statute, which is contrary to what the Supreme Court has 
held); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F.Supp.3d 165, 188, (D.D.C. 2016) 
(reasoning that the defendant’s argument that they deserve deference pursuant to their 
interpretation of 31 USC § 1324 fails). 
 53 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme 
Court chose not to find an implicit delegation despite ambiguity after relying on principles 
of statutory interpretation and Congressional intent). 
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Congress.54 Interestingly, if the reviewing court instead found an implicit 
delegation of lawmaking power, it would grant an agency the authority to change 
the regulatorily-made law in the future as policy decisions should respond to 
changing factual circumstances and changes in political administrations. 
Delegating authority to an agency to make law is also accompanied by the 
authority to change that law.55 
Second, the Court determined it was not appropriate for the agency to resolve 
such an issue since it lacked the necessary policymaking expertise.56 These are 
some of the factors that the reviewing court will consider when determining 
whether there has been an implicit delegation of lawmaking power to the agency. 
It is evident that the reviewing court holds ultimate power to decide if Congress 
intended implicitly to delegate to an agency the power to resolve authoritatively 
the statutory ambiguity.57 
Suppose that the reviewing court has determined that the statute is ambiguous, 
and that Congress intended implicitly to delegate lawmaking power to the 
agency. The nature and extent of judicial scrutiny at Chevron step two to 
determine if an agency’s interpretation warrants categorical deference is a 
question in a state of flux.58 Recall, the legal theory that underlies Chevron is 
                                                          
 54 Id. 
 55 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting In On The Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2359, 2417 n. 355 (2018) (“A second response hinges on the particular political 
stakes—namely that upholding the Act on Chevron grounds, giving deference to the IRS’s 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, would mean that the Act would be 
susceptible to political unraveling down the road, should the IRS change its interpretation in 
a new administration. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts raised this concern [during the] oral 
argument [of King v. Burwell].”) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114)). 
 56 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (explaining how the Court found the IRS wasn’t the 
appropriate agency to decide the relevant issue given its lack of expertise in crafting health 
insurance policy). 
 57 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 n.9 (1984); 
FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981). 
 58 Compare Herz, supra note 1, at 1885 (explaining how at Chevron step two, “the 
agency is no longer on the court’s turf, the court is on the agency’s” and thus there is little 
room for judicial scrutiny), with King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (discussing how in 
extraordinary cases, judicial scrutiny may be required to limit deference under Chevron step 
two), and Asher Steinberg, Encino Motorcars, Cuozzo, and the Impossible Dream of Step 
Two Arbitrary and Capricious Review, THE NARROWEST GROUNDS (June 29, 2016), 
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/06/encino-motorcars-cuozzo-and-
impossible.html (explaining that at step two, interpretive reasonableness should not suffice 
for a court to hold that an agency’s statutory interpretive choice deserves categorical 
deference. Furthermore, interpretive reasonableness supported by an agency’s legal 
justification for what it determined to be the intention of Congress should also fail the step 
two test. To warrant Chevron deference, an agency needs to satisfy both an interpretive 
reasonableness standard and a rigorous reason-giving requirement in which the agency 
supplies empirical and policy-based reasons for its interpretive choice). 
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that deference is warranted because Congress has implicitly delegated 
lawmaking power to an agency to make law to fill gaps in a statute.59 That is, an 
agency is expected to resolve a statutory ambiguity by making law since the gap 
represents the absence of congressionally-made law on the issue.60 
Questions of interest that apply to both Chevron and Auer deference center 
upon: (1) distinguishing the mode of reasoning an agency uses to justify its 
interpretive choice and; (2) whether the kind, or mode of reasoning should be a 
factor in deciding whether a court grants categorical deference. First, it is 
important to distinguish the mode of reasoning an agency uses to justify its 
interpretive choice.61 One mode of reasoning is prescriptive reasoning. This is 
when “an agency exercises its discretion to implement a legislative directive by 
weighing evidence, utilizing technical expertise, and making policy choices.”62 
This mode of reasoning is consistent with Chevron’s underlying theory that 
assumes that an agency is using its delegated authority to fill gaps in statutory 
law. This requires an agency to utilize its subject matter expertise and 
policymaking skills to make legislative-type judgments (reflecting the values of 
the current Administration) which serve to justify its interpretive choice. 
A second, different mode of reasoning is called expository reasoning. This 
mode of reasoning is when an agency attempts to determine, “what Congress 
actually intended with respect to a particular issue or what the relevant judicial 
precedents dictate the proper answer to be.”63 The agency subordinates its 
authority to what legal texts instruct it to decide. Essentially, an agency is 
performing a judicial task by approaching the problem with a neutral and 
dispassionate mind-set, free from political considerations to determine the 
meaning inherent of a statute or regulation. 
However, when an agency relies on prescriptive reasoning, it is making law. 
Whereas, when an agency relies on expository reasoning, it is making a 
statement about what the meaning of the law is.64 It is a logical extension of the 
distinction between these modes of reasoning to conceive of the Chevron 
framework as demanding the use of expository reasoning at step one and 
prescriptive reasoning at step two.65 That is, in the presence of statutory 
                                                          
 59 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44; Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency 
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17 (1990). 
 60 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
 61 Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
112, 115 (2011) (describing how an agency’s chosen mode of reasoning is an 
underappreciated feature of agency action and the different modes of reasoning an agency 
may use to justify a change in its action). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 117. 
 64 Id. at 141-42. 
 65 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 n. 9 
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ambiguity, deference is warranted when an agency selects a statutory 
interpretation based on its lawmaking skills and explains its interpretive choice 
using prescriptive reasoning. Comparatively, if the agency relies on expository 
reasons during step two of the analysis, it is making its interpretive choice to 
coincide with what it determines to be the interpretation that Congress intended, 
rather than filling gaps in a statute when Congress had no intention regarding 
the issue at question. The agency’s interpretive choice may be a valuable source 
for understanding what Congress intended to decide in the statute, but it does 
not warrant categorical defense based on the theory that underlies the Chevron 
framework. 
At Chevron step two, an agency’s interpretive choice must fall within the 
parameters set forth in Chevron, which are the set of permissible interpretations, 
as determined by the reviewing court.66 But, to earn categorical deference, the 
agency should be asked to do more.67 The reviewing court must not only ensure 
that the agency’s interpretive choice falls within Chevron space but it must also 
ensure that the agency’s exercise of its discretion within Chevron space is not 
arbitrary and capricious.68 The Court should consider the reasons an agency 
provides for its interpretive choice to determine if deference is appropriate. On 
one hand, an agency that offers expository reasons for its choice, even though it 
may have used a formal procedure such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, it 
in effect, offered an interpretive rule for the statute.69 That is, the agency’s legal 
reasoning merely clarified what Congress intended an ambiguous term to mean 
even though the reviewing court at step one had concluded that the statute was 
ambiguous. Apparently, in the agency’s view, the statute was ambiguous but not 
                                                          
(1984) (Courts are instructed to use the “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” to 
ascertain congressional intent at step one). 
 66 Id. at 843-44. 
 67 Sharkey, supra note 55, at 2371-85 (identifying several cases in which a reviewing 
court grants categorical deference for an agency’s statutory interpretation that falls within 
the Chevron space, but the agency offers either a minimally reasonable explanation for its 
choice or a legal justification for its interpretive choice. This article agrees with Professor 
Sharkey that such an approach to step two is not consistent with the underlying assumptions 
of the Chevron framework, that incorporates a reasoned decision-making requirement for its 
interpretive/policy decision). 
 68 Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them Chevron Space and 
Skidmore Weight, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 9, 9 (2012). 
 69 Sharkey, supra note 55, at 2372 (analyzing a water-pollution case, Catskill Mountains 
Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, involving contrary deference decisions of a district 
court and the circuit court, the author concludes that the circuit court’s decision to grant 
deference to the agency’s interpretation (overturning the district court) was in error: “What 
is missing from the EPA’s legal exegesis is any fact finding, critical analysis, or even 
explicit acknowledgement of any underlying policy considerations embedded in what is 
essentially an interpretive rule.” In short, the circuit court incorrectly granted categorical 
deference for a statutory interpretation that was justified using expository reasoning. This 
type of agency reasoning only warrants less deferential Skidmore deference). 
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indeterminate.70 In fact, in reality, the agency made a step one decision under 
the umbrella of a step two analysis. It is clear, under the legal foundation of 
Chevron, that the reviewing court holds interpretive power in step one decisions 
and categorical deference for an agency’s statutory interpretation is 
unwarranted. It is likely that some ambiguity in a statute can be resolved 
satisfactorily by the court’s ultimate determination.71 
On the other hand, when a reviewing court determines whether the agency’s 
statutory interpretation is a reasonable choice it should demand that an agency 
demonstrate prescriptive reasoning for its choice. The prescriptive reasons 
should describe how the agency utilized its subject matter expertise and political 
judgments to make law when there is a gap left by the statute. Expository 
reasoning should not suffice for it is not intended to fill a gap but merely to 
clarify existing law.72 It is time for courts to distinguish, in a case of statutory 
ambiguity, between agency efforts to determine the law that Congress intended 
to make from those efforts to make law in gaps in the statute. As Steinberg 
persuasively argues, 
32 years after Chevron was decided, the Court still doesn’t 
understand—or understands but refuses to admit—that there are no 
good reasons for mandatory [categorical] deference (as opposed to 
contingent Skidmore deference) to agency regulations that adopt a 
particular interpretation of a statute because the agency says the 
statute is textually best read that way. 32 years after Chevron was 
decided, the Court still doesn’t understand—or understands but 
refuses to admit—that Chevron only gives agencies deference on the 
                                                          
 70 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859-61 (1984). 
 71 It is recognized that this point runs contrary to the current understanding of 
administrative law that rejects the interpretation  versus policymaking distinction. See 
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1089-90 (2016) (the thrust 
of this article is that such a distinction is both coherent and judicially manageable and that 
“It would represent a triumph of classical, pre-legalist thought that, while aware of the 
blurriness in the lines between making, executing, and interpreting law, nevertheless insists 
that the division of these activities was coherent in theory and estimable in practice.”). 
 72 Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 61, at 153-54 (explaining the Kozel and Pojanowski 
model assumes that expository factors that determine the meaning of existing law are 
distinct from prescriptive factors that enable an agency to make new law. The authors 
respond to the argument that their model is too simplistic and that, in reality, “… the process 
of exposition necessarily entails consideration of factors such as optimal policy and political 
preferences.” The authors provide persuasive rebuttals to this argument. For instance, they 
(at 154) argue, “even if some ambiguity exists, it is erroneously reductive to assume that the 
only recourse is application of policy preferences. Disputes over statutory meaning or the 
trajectory of judicial precedent are more nuanced than that. To be sure, some statutory 
provisions contain phrases (for example, “in the public interest”) that invite prescriptive 
policy choices. But in many cases considerations of text, structure, and purpose will suggest 
a best reading exogenous to the decisionmaker’s ideology.”). 
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premise and condition that they do not interpret statutes that way, but 
instead make policy choices that call on expertise, public opinion, 
and presidential preferences.73 
Consistent with the modern conception of interpretation that if the line 
between interpretation and policymaking is blurry, courts face significant 
difficulty when determining whether the agency’s interpretation is explaining 
existing law or making new law.74 One way to distinguish between the two 
modes of reasoning is for the court to examine the reasons an agency gives for 
its statutory interpretation. The reviewing court should determine whether the 
agency’s reasoning analysis relied on legal interpretation skills (such as reliance 
on textual analysis, legislative history, the overall structure and purposes of the 
statutory scheme) or by the use of its subject matter expertise (such as use of 
cost-benefit analysis and fact-finding) and political judgments. That is, a court 
is fully capable of assessing the type of reasoning an agency utilized to defend 
its statutory interpretation unless one subscribes to the view that all statutory 
interpretation, regardless of the reasoning utilized, is a function of 
policymaking.75 But that view of interpretation, paradoxically, is inconsistent 
with the two-step method implementing the Chevron framework. 
Chevron distinguishes between the judicial function, exercised by courts at 
step one and an agency’s legislative-like function, exercised when it makes law 
at step two.76 In addition, a court can look to what the agency says its 
interpretation is doing. Does it say, when justifying its statutory interpretation, 
that it found what Congress intended to be the best policy in the statute or what 
judicial precedents required it to do? If so, this is a sign that it likely engaged 
expository reasoning for which categorical deference is not warranted.77 
                                                          
 73 Steinberg, supra note 58. 
 74 Id. (describing an interesting exchange during oral argument in the case of Encino 
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) between a participating lawyer and 
Justice Kagan in which the Justice admits that the Court has not taken into consideration for 
the deference decision at step two the reasons the agency uses to justify its interpretation. 
Specifically, categorical deference has been granted when the agency merely says that its 
interpretation is justified because that is how the agency read the statute. Reading a statute 
would indicate that the agency has not made new law but merely found existing law). 
 75 See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 61, at 142. 
 76 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(describing that “if the statue is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute”). 
 77 Steinberg, supra note 58 (arguing “[a]nd while a distinction between purely 
interpretive and policy reasoning might be unadministrable, the proper distinction between 
agencies that profess to say what Congress meant and agencies that profess to be making 
policy decisions is probably much easier to draw.”); see also Herz, supra note 25, at 187, 
200-01, 229-30, 232 (1992) (“Indeed, absent express delegation of interpretive authority, 
whenever an agency says, explicitly or implicitly, “we think Congress intended...,” its 
conclusion must be reviewed under step one. What Congress intended is a question for the 
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II.  AUER DEFERENCE AS AN EXTENSION OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE. 
A. Resolution of the tension between interpretation under Chevron Deference 
and the Administrative Procedure Act 
The approach to Chevron step two analysis emphasizes the conceptual and 
practical differences, as revealed in judicial precedents and legislative action 
such as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), between a legislative rule 
and an interpretive rule.78 That is, there is a difference between an agency’s 
statutory interpretation that makes law, by the creation of new rights, duties, or 
responsibilities, and an interpretation that clarifies existing law. But how can this 
distinction be reconciled with Chevron’s assumption that policymaking and 
interpretation are indistinguishable?79 The tension between the Chevron and the 
APA conception of interpretation is apparent in the Supreme Court case, Perez 
v. Mortgage Bankers Association.80 
The dispute involved a D.C. Circuit rule that required any administrative 
agency that changed a definitive interpretation of a regulation, to use notice-and-
comment rulemaking for the new interpretation.81 The Paralyzed Veterans 
Doctrine arose from concern on the part of the D.C. Circuit court that it was too 
                                                          
courts. It may be that the agency is wrong, and Congress had no intent, but that is for the 
court to decide.”). 
 78 Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (“The Administrative Act 
(APA) establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use for “rule making,” 
defined as the process of “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” The APA 
distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called “legislative rules” are issued through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking and have the “force and effect of law.” “Interpretive rules,” 
by contrast, are “issued . . . to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes 
and rules which it administers,” do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking, and “do not 
have the force and effect of law,”) (citations omitted). 
 79 Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 61, at 151 (supporting the idea that there are real, 
underappreciated differences between interpretation and policymaking in Chevron although 
it is common to conclude that the framework is based on the assumption that it is not 
possible to distinguish interpretation from policymaking. More accurately, under Chevron, 
pure interpretation remains within the authority of the courts to determine all law that 
Congress has made in the statute whereas policymaking is a result of a congressional 
command to delegate to an agency the law-making authority to make law when there is a 
gap in statutory law. “While Chevron is most famous for linking policymaking discretion 
with the resolution of textual ambiguity, another notable feature of the case is its affirmation 
of how the meaning of legal texts define and cabin administrative discretion.”). 
 80 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205 (explaining that a change in the Department of Labor’s 
interpretation of one of its regulation is an interpretive rule that, of course, was not the result 
of a notice-and-comment rulemaking. The new interpretation concluded that mortgage-loan 
officers were eligible for overtime compensation). 
 81 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587-88 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (creating the new judge-made rule referred to as the Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine). 
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easy for an agency to flip-flop on an issue that seemingly had been settled by a 
prior agency interpretation so that the prior interpretation had effectively become 
part of the law.82 Of particular concern was that there was no need to use any 
type of formal process, there was a lack of required public comment, and a lack 
of rigorous judicial review of the change. 
The D.C. Circuit offered a procedural remedy to correct a problem 
determining that there was no existing ex ante procedural check or ex post 
judicial check on possible arbitrary agency action.83 If one subscribes to the 
conceptual view that interpretation is policymaking, an ex-ante procedural rule 
is appropriate for a new interpretation which creates new rights and duties that 
should result from the use of a formal process. Under this conception of 
interpretation, there is no difference between an interpretive rule and a 
legislative rule. In either situation, the agency is filling a gap in an ambiguous 
regulation just as in Chevron, where the agency is filling a gap in an ambiguous 
statute.84 As such, when an agency changes an interpretation of a regulation it 
is, in reality, creating new law.85 With such a view of interpretation, the 
Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine seemed to make sense. However, the Court found 
the judge-made doctrine to be inconsistent with APA procedural requirements.86 
The Court’s unanimous holding, relying on the literal text of the APA, 
maintained that there are distinguishing differences87 between a legislative rule 
(creates law and requires a formal process) and an interpretive rule (clarifies 
existing law and no need for a formal process). Since the rule in question was an 
                                                          
 82 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (overturning Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. 
Arena in part and explaining that if the agency is flip-flopping on a legislative rule, then the 
agency must undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking; however, does not need to use 
informal rulemaking for interpretive rules); see Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 
(requiring federal agencies to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when they 
substantially altered an “interpretive” rule). 
 83 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586. 
 84 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984). 
 85 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203 (explaining that published interpretations do not have the 
effect of law but are heavily relied upon by the public); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009) (explaining that when an agency changes direction and 
departs from a prior policy, it need not “provide detailed justification than would suffice for 
a new policy created on a blank slate”); see Paralyzed Veterans of America, 117 F.3d at 
586-87 (explaining that their holding applies to subsequent interpretive rules, but not 
elaborating on whether agencies must undergo notice-and-comment for their initial 
interpretive rule). 
 86 Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 584. 
 87 Herz, supra note 1, at 1881 (“the constitutional structure, the APA’s distinction 
between legislative and interpretive rules, centuries of jurisprudence, and most people’s 
intuitions accept a distinction between interpreting law and making law.”); Perez, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1203-04 (relying on the literal text of the APA to draw a distinction between legislative 
and interpretive rulemaking); Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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interpretive rule,88 APA requirements should be strictly followed, and 
interpretive rules are unambiguously exempt from notice-and-comment.89 
However, the underlying tension between the Chevron concept of interpretation 
and the APA concept was not addressed.90 
The Perez case was resolved as a rather simple case based on APA procedural 
requirements, but the real fireworks were contained in the three concurrences 
that raised a controversial issue not at question in the case.91 The concurrences, 
while not questioning the Court’s decision to deny the authority of a lower court 
to add a procedural requirement without congressional approval, focused on the 
lack of strict judicial scrutiny of agency interpretations of their own regulations 
that results in those rules having binding power on courts.92 When a court relies 
on Auer deference, interpretive rules lack either ex ante procedural protections 
or ex post rigorous judicial scrutiny. This implicates an administrative law 
principle that is captured by the phrase: “pay me now or pay me later.”93 This 
means that a more forgiving ex post judicial review standard, such as categorical 
deference, is earned by an agency undertaking rigorous ex ante procedures, such 
as notice-and-comment. However, when a rule is produced in a more informal 
manner ex ante, it should be subject to a stricter ex post judicial review standard, 
such as an epistemologically-based standard of review.94 The Paralyzed 
Veterans Doctrine was ultimately an unsuccessful effort to apply this principle. 
 
 
                                                          
 88 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (explaining the APA process for rule making and 
interpretation); see Adam J. White, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers: Heralding the Demise of 
Auer Deference?, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333, 346-47 (2014-2015) (explaining that the 
Court asserted that this view was subscribed to by both sides in the dispute, but one can 
question this assertion). 
 89 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203. 
 90 Pojanowski, supra note 37 (commenting on the D.C. Circuit’s rule before the 
outcome of the Perez case stated “Or, if the D.C. Circuit is wrong [as it turned out to be], 
and if the APA precludes notice-and-comment for modification of interpretive rules, that 
could be because the APA assumes an understanding of interpretation that is quite less 
policy-laden than the conventional wisdom in administrative law and scholarship.”). 
 91 See Perez,135 S. Ct. at 1210-25 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment; Scalia, J., concurring in judgment; and Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
 92 Id. at 1212, 1224 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment; and Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 93 See Craig J. Duchossois Revocable Tr. v. CDX Labs., Inc., 495 F.Supp.2d 869, 871 
(2006) (explaining phrase “pay me now or pay me later”); David Weyher, Pay Me Now or 
Pay Me Later, SWEET PAY (Aug. 17, 2018), https://sweetwaytopay.com/2018/08/17/pay-me-
now-or-pay-me-later/ (explaining how phrase “pay me now, or pay me later” is relevant 
across goods and services). 
 94 See White, supra note 88, at 354, 356. 
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B. Auer Deference Improperly Transfers Law Interpretation Power to the 
Executive Branch 
Why would the Court create a deference doctrine that violated this 
principle?95 To begin to understand the answer to the question, one must first 
realize that, in many ways, today’s Auer deference is modelled after Chevron 
deference. It has evolved into a doctrine that grants categorical deference to 
agency interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations with some exceptions to 
deference,96 just as Chevron grants categorical deference to an agency’s 
statutory interpretation subject to some exceptions.97  However, the Auer 
doctrine is not supported with its own theoretical model but instead has resorted 
to explanations based on an assumption that an agency knows its rules better 
than anyone else and its similarity to Chevron.98 In fact, proposals for 
improvement in Auer often suggest that the limitations in Auer should be 
modelled after those that apply for Chevron.99 
Before further incremental improvements to the modern conception of Auer 
should be considered, one must first consider whether there is legal justification 
for a court to give binding deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation. There is no legal justification for a court to give categorical deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of what an existing regulation means.100 Recall, in 
                                                          
 95 See Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimov, The Court’s Deferences—-a Foolish 
Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. NEWS 10, 11 (2000) (arguing that the APA contemplated 
plenary judicial review of interpretive rules. Auer deference “contradicts the reason the 
framers of the APA included an exception [to notice-and-comment] for interpretative rules 
in Section 553; namely, that such rules are subject to “plenary judicial review.”); Herz, 
supra note 25, at 213 n. 131 (“The Senate Report accompanying the Administrative 
Procedure Act explained that notice and comment was unnecessary for interpretive rules 
because these “rules”—as merely interpretations of statutory provisions –are subject to 
plenary judicial review.” S. DOC. NO. 248, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS. 18 (1946)). 
 96 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012) 
(showing that Auer Deference is not appropriate in all cases, for example, “when the 
agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” “when there 
is reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question,” or “when it appears that the interpretation is 
nothing more than a convenient litigating position, “ or “post-hoc rationalization.”). 
 97 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (suggesting that Chevron 
should not apply when a “question of deep economic and political significance” is at issue 
and Congress has not explicitly delegated authority to an agency to deal with the issue). 
 98 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 90 
(2018). 
 99 See, e.g., Brief of Professors—Dean Ronald A. Cass, Christopher C. Demuth, Sr., and 
Christopher J. Walker—As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15-16, Gloucester 
County School Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016), (No. 16-273) (arguing 
among other things, that Auer should not only follow Chevron deference in its application to 
agencies who have not clearly been given discretion but should be stricter in its application). 
 100 The one exception to this conclusion is if Congress gives the agency explicit authority 
to make such an interpretive determination. However, there seems to be little legal 
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Chevron, the Court provided that the power that Congress delegated to an 
agency was power that it had been vested with pursuant to Article I of the 
Constitution, that is, the power to make law.101 Although, the Chevron decision 
labelled this as a delegation of interpretive power, it is more appropriately 
considered a conferral of lawmaking power to fill gaps in statutory law.102 
Congress did not delegate interpretive power granting an agency deference for 
its understanding of the commands that Congress issued in the statute. 
Furthermore, as with Chevron deference, it is not up to reviewing courts to 
decide whether they should defer to an agency regulatory interpretation, it is 
Congress’ decision.103 
The basic premise of modern Auer deference is that when Congress delegates 
lawmaking power to an administrative agency this includes a delegation of 
interpretive power to the agency to say what its own regulations mean.104 There 
are several flaws in this premise. First, one reason that Congress is permitted to 
delegate lawmaking power to an agency is because it can directly control the 
magnitude of the power delegated by how specifically it writes its statutory 
commands and by inclusion of an intelligible principle to cabin the agency’s 
discretion. The magnitude of an agency’s discretion is directly controlled by 
Congress.105 No such argument can be made with respect to an indirect 
delegation of authority. Congress has little control over the specificity an agency 
uses when it writes a regulation.106 In fact, one of the complaints about Auer 
deference is that the doctrine encourages an agency to write ambiguous 
regulations to which it can subsequently add specificity in order to make real 
policies by using interpretive rules (rules lacking either ex ante procedural or ex 
                                                          
justification for a court to find an implicit delegation of such interpretive authority. 
 101 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 102 Siegel, supra note 29, at 964-65. 
 103 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 104 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680-81 (1992) (identifying how 
the premise of Auer deference is inconsistent with a constitutional requirement that the 
lawmaking and law interpretation functions should be controlled by separate branches of 
government. Under this view, Chevron deference does not violate the constitutional 
requirement because Congress writes the law that an agency interprets. In contrast, if a court 
grants categorical deference to an agency interpretation of one of its own regulations, the 
same entity is engaged in both functions); see also Peter M. Torstensen Jr., The Curious 
Case of Seminole Rock: Revisiting Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of their 
Ambiguous Regulations, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 817 (2015) (noting a common-sense 
argument for Auer deference that “if Congress intends to have an agency resolve 
ambiguities in a statute, surely [. . .] it intends for an agency to resolve ambiguities in its 
own regulations.”). 
 105 Elliott, supra note 39, at 6-7. 
 106 Manning, supra note 104, at 662 (arguing that when agencies self-interpret vague 
rules through adjudication, the efficacy of notice-and-comment rulemaking is reduced). 
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post judicial protections for the public).107 
Second, when Congress delegates lawmaking power to an agency, it is 
reducing its own legislative power, while also increasing the power of the other 
political branch of government.108  This alters the balance of power between the 
two political branches. With Auer deference, the issue is not simply the transfer 
of power but the enhancement of executive power since the agency retains power 
to make regulations and adds interpretive power over its own ambiguous 
regulations.109 This can potentially lead to a dangerous accumulation of power 
in the executive branch.110 
Third, in Chevron, Congress is directly delegating its power to a different 
branch of government.111 In contrast, the Auer premise assumes that Congress’ 
delegation of lawmaking power implicitly includes a subsumed, indirect 
delegation of power. This implies that the initial grant of authority from 
Congress effectively assigns authority to an agency to delegate to itself 
interpretive power over its own regulations.112 Self-delegation is not consistent 
with the lawmaking authority that Congress can exercise or with the 
constitutional imperative to separate the three branches of government. These 
flaws were neither acknowledged nor addressed in Court decisions implicating 
modern Auer deference until Justice Scalia began to call for reexamination of 
the doctrine in 2011.113 It is now evident that the Auer premise is built on a shaky 
foundation. The deference doctrine has been propped up with additional 
limitations but still lacks a solid theoretical explanation. 
Furthermore, proponents in favor of Congress delegating lawmaking power 
to an agency to make law to fill gaps in statutory language, argue the agency 
holds subject matter expertise and remains politically accountable. However, 
these policies do not necessarily apply to the interpretation of an existing, 
ambiguous regulation. According to the APA, an interpretive rule is not intended 
to make a new policy choice but rather to clarify how the agency interprets a 
                                                          
 107 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 91. 
 108 Manning, supra note 104, at 654 (urging that if Congress does not specify policies 
clearly during the process of bicameralism and presentment, it risks giving power to 
another). 
 109 See White, supra note 88, at 334-35 (describing how agencies are unaccountable to 
the ‘people’ yet make most of the federal law through their regulations or adjudications). 
 110 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(describing that Auer deference contributes to the increasing power of administrative 
agencies). 
 111 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 112 See Brief of Professors, supra note 99, at 6 (“The discretionary authority granted to 
the agency by law should not be seen as a “nested” grant of authority—-akin to a set of 
Russian “matryoshka” dolls—-with each grant containing an implicit sub-grant of further 
discretion…”). 
 113 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
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regulation it has already promulgated.114 One would expect an agency to rely on 
expository reasoning to justify its interpretive rule. If the agency is, in fact, 
making new policy with an interpretive rule, then the agency is obligated to use 
notice-and-comment and Auer deference is inapplicable.115 A signal that the 
agency is making policy is if it relies on prescriptive reasoning for its 
interpretation. A purported interpretative rule that, in reality, creates new policy 
should be classified as a legislative rule, subject to the Chevron framework. In 
other words, there is a fundamental difference between an agency creating new 
policy in a gap in an ambiguous regulation and an agency clarifying an existing 
regulation. An implicit delegation of lawmaking power to an agency to fill in 
gaps in an ambiguous statute is rooted in a solid theoretical model but there is 
no such theoretically-justified model for Congress to assign power implicitly to 
an agency to interpret an existing regulation that it had itself promulgated.116 
Notwithstanding the failure to articulate a convincing theoretical, or legal 
explanation for an implicit self-delegation of interpretive power to an agency for 
its own regulations and similar to how the Chevron deference model has 
evolved, the Court has created a preliminary step to assess whether Congress 
intended to delegate implicitly interpretive power to an agency to clarify agency 
policy decisions inherent in one of its legislative regulations.117 For instance, in 
the Perez decision, the Court identifies situations in which Auer deference is not 
appropriate. The Court said, “Auer deference is inappropriate ‘when the 
agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’ 
or ‘when there is reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not 
reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment.’”118 
Alternatively, exceptions to Auer deference are accurately portrayed to 
address situations when it is unlikely that an agency’s regulatory interpretation 
is truly an interpretive rule. For example, the Court created the “parroting 
exception” in which, if the Court finds that an agency’s legislative rule merely 
parroted the statute, then Auer deference is denied to an agency’s regulatory 
interpretation since the interpretation is not of the regulation but of the statute.119 
Accordingly, the agency regulatory interpretation is, in fact, likely making new 
                                                          
 114 See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203. 
 115 Air Transport Ass’n v. Dep’t of Trans., 900 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated 
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991). 
 116 Hasen, supra note 30, at 344-45. 
 117 Perez, 135 U.S. at 1208 n.4 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410 (1945)). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Gonzales v. Oregon 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (explaining that “[s]imply put, the 
existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the 
meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute.”). 
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policy in a gap left by the statute and not clarifying an existing regulation. That 
is, the agency regulatory interpretation is not of the regulation but of the statute 
and should be subject to the standard of review for statutory interpretations. The 
agency, by parroting the statute, failed to use its policymaking skills, which 
should have been expressed in its prescriptive reasoning in promulgating the 
legislative rule, but instead applied those skills in a subsequent setting to make 
policy absent the procedural protections that such policymaking demands. 
Auer deference is denied when the reviewing court finds that the interpretive 
rule is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”120 First, an 
inconsistent interpretation suggests that rather than clarifying an existing policy, 
the agency has attempted to create a new regulation without use of notice-and-
comment. In Christensen v. Harris,121 the Court attempted to enforce the line 
between interpretations and amendments to existing regulations by suggesting 
that an interpretation that differs from the clear meaning can be viewed as an 
attempt by the agency, “under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de 
facto a new regulation.”122 Second, a finding of plainly erroneous indicates that 
the court found no logical connection between the regulation and what the 
agency says the regulation means. If so, the interpretation is likely to be a new 
policy. In each of these situations, deference is unwarranted when a court finds 
the agency failed to provide clarification of an existing regulation. 
Other recent exceptions to Auer deference have little to do with whether a 
court finds an implicit delegation of interpretive power to an agency for its own 
regulations. For instance, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,123 the 
Court denied Auer deference because the Department of Labor changed its 
interpretation of a regulation that resulted in an “unfair surprise” for regulated 
parties. Whether there was an implicit delegation of interpretive power is 
irrelevant to the reason for the denial of deference. Rather the exception to 
deference reflects a concern on the part of the court to ensure that regulated 
parties have sufficient notice of the rules that govern them.124 
There is little doubt that Auer deference has evolved in a manner patterned 
after Chevron deference.125 To expand on this point, Professor Pojanowski 
identified two related features describing the modern view of Auer deference. 
                                                          
 120 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 121 Christensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2159 (2012) (discussing 
the Department of Labor’s change in an interpretation of a regulation identifying employees 
that were exempt from statutory requirements regarding overtime pay). 
 124 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 97. 
 125 Id. at 90 (“By 2017, Sunstein and Vermeule’s Chevron-inflected justification of 
Seminole Rock/Auer is not so much an innovation as a cogent account of the doctrine’s 
standard justification.”); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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He states, 
[f]irst, it understands Seminole Rock/Auer as a kind of Baby Chevron 
doctrine; the question is whether and how the Chevron framework 
for statutory interpretation should transfer to regulatory 
interpretation. Second, it understands Seminole Rock and Auer as 
representing a unified doctrine, linking them together both 
typologically (with a “/”) and jurisprudentially on the terms of 
Chevron.126 
Each feature of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. First, the legal theory 
that underlies Chevron along with the justifications for judicial deference do not 
transfer to the Auer framework.127 Second, Seminole Rock deference is a 
fundamentally different doctrine from Auer deference in the type of deference 
called for and the reasons justifying a form of deference.128 It is time for the 
Court to return to Seminole Rock. To demonstrate this latter point, consider the 
view of the deference that was embodied in the original Seminole Rock case. 
III. RETURN TO SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE. 
The Seminole Rock case involved an interpretation by the Office of Price 
Administration (“OPA”), of a regulation that it wrote to implement the directives 
contained in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.129 Specifically, the 
question at issue centered on the meaning of the regulatory term “Highest price 
charged during March, 1942.”130 In resolving the case, the Court announced that 
since the legislative rule was determined to be ambiguous, deference should be 
given to the regulatory interpretation. The court stated, “the ultimate criterion is 
the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling  weight unless it 
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”131 Subsequently, the 
rule has been interpreted to mean that an agency’s interpretations of its own 
regulations are eligible for categorical deference if they satisfy the generous 
standard established by the Court in Seminole Rock.132 The Court provided no 
legal foundation for the rule but did cite several factors that seemed to contribute 
to its holding: (1) the fact that the interpretation was published 
contemporaneously with the regulation, (2) agency personnel in the OPA had 
published a document that explained in detail how the OPA interpreted the 
                                                          
 126 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 92. 
 127 See notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
 128 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 97. 
 129 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 412 (1945). 
 130 Id. at 414. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 413-14. 
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regulation’s meaning, and (3) agency personnel had responded in a consistent 
manner to regulated parties inquiries regarding how they should go about 
complying with the regulation.133 Each of these factors can be viewed as 
contributing to the Court’s trust in the agency’s understanding of the intent of 
the regulation, a regulation that the same agency personnel had 
contemporaneously constructed. 
Pojanowski has argued persuasively that the decision in the Seminole Rock 
case can be viewed as the application of a judicial standard established by the 
Court in the previous year.134  In Skidmore v. Swift Co.,135 the Court addressed 
the amount of credence reviewing courts should give to agency statutory 
interpretations. Thus, the decision in Seminole Rock can be viewed as a natural 
extension of the Court’s recently articulated view of the appropriate standard of 
review for agency statutory interpretations to an issue implicating an agency 
regulatory interpretation. Under the Skidmore standard, the Court holds final 
interpretive authority of a statute or regulation.136 The objective of the court is 
to find the correct interpretation of the decisions inherent in the legal text.137  
Courts consider agencies to be a potentially highly valued source of knowledge 
with respect to identifying the inherent meaning of the text. Nonetheless, the 
reviewing court will only give considerable weight to an agency’s interpretation 
if the court determines it to be persuasive. In making its decision, a reviewing 
court is instructed that “the weight of [the agency’s] judgment . . . will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all the factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”138  In the Mead decision, 
the Court reintroduced the Skidmore standard and concluded that it is the default 
standard of review for an agency’s statutory interpretation if the court 
determines that the interpretation does not qualify for consideration of 
categorical deference.139  A similar conclusion should be applied to an agency’s 
regulatory interpretations, that an interpretive rule is not the result of an agency 
exercising delegated legislative power. 
                                                          
 133 Brief of Professors supra note 99, at 17-20; see Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present 
and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Rule of Agency 
Interpretations of Regulations, 62 KAN. L. REV. 633, 636-37, 639 (2014) (explaining the 
deference given to agency interpretations by courts). 
 134 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 92. 
 135 Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Contrast this objective to that in Chevron where the agency, using delegated power, is 
making law in a gap in a statute because Congress did not resolve the issue. There is no 
congressionally-made correct answer to be found but only an interpretation that can 
reasonably fill the gap in a text. 
 138 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 139 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001). 
98 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 27.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
In considering the weight a court assigns to an agency’s interpretation of a 
legal text, the court retains final interpretive authority.140 In contrast to the 
Chevron doctrine that provides for the possibility of a grant of categorical 
deference (thus, transferring interpretive power from a court to an agency), there 
is no need to develop a new legal theory for a doctrine that provides only for the 
reviewing court to determine the weight to be given to an agency legal 
interpretation. Rather, what is needed is a rationale to justify the weight that a 
court should assign to an agency interpretation. In the 1940s, a widely used 
approach for conducting textual interpretation focused on discerning the 
intentions of the author of the text, such as Congress for a statute, or an agency 
for a regulation.141 For instance when considering a regulation created by an 
agency, it seems intuitive to give considerable weight to an agency’s view of 
what the authors of the regulation intended for it to mean. A reviewing court 
would look for signs of authorial reliability or unreliability in deciding how 
much weight to give to the agency’s regulatory interpretation.142 
At the time of the Seminole Rock case, there was no conception of an 
interpretive model that viewed the agency as having relied on congressionally 
delegated lawmaking power to make law by filling gaps in ambiguous 
regulations. Rather, the agency regulatory interpretation was of probative value 
to the extent that it could help the court identify the inherent meaning of a 
regulation. One key indicator of a reliable author, that was present in the 
Seminole Rock case, is if the regulation and its interpretation were 
contemporaneously promulgated.143 On the other hand, as is now quite 
frequently the case (e.g., see details of Perez and Christopher cases)144, an 
agency purports to clarify the meaning of a regulation that was promulgated 
many years prior to the agency interpretation.145 Such a post-promulgation 
                                                          
 140 White, supra note 88, at 353. 
 141 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 92. 
 142 Id. at 95 (“Under Skidmore, an administrative author’s account need not be decisive: 
an author’s hasty, poorly reasoned, inconsistent, or plainly countertextual claim about the 
meaning of its legal pronouncement would raise suspicions about the sincerity or reliability 
of the narrator.”). 
 143 Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). 
 144 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015); Christopher v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 153 (2012). 
 145 See Stephen M. DeGenaro, Why Should We Care About An Agency’s Special Insight, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 924 (2014) (“The typical originalist argument emphasizes the 
fact that the agency that wrote a regulation has “special insight” into the “original intent” of 
the regulation, and that the original intent of the regulation should control its interpretation. 
Courts following this reasoning will defer to an agency’s interpretation when the court 
determines that the interpretation reflects the agency’s special insight into the regulation’s 
meaning—-such as when the agency’s interpretation is made shortly after the regulation is 
promulgated, or when the interpretation represents a consistently held view of the agency.”). 
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interpretation is more likely to reflect the political views of the current 
administration rather than the original intent of the promulgating agency.146 
However, a court is likely to assign less weight to an agency’s non-
contemporaneous interpretation if the court is interested in understanding the 
original meaning of a regulation when it decides on its regulatory interpretation. 
Nevertheless, because under the Skidmore standard, the court is instructed to 
consider all factors that have the power to persuade the court, there may be other 
factors that indicate to the reviewing court that the current agency’s regulatory 
interpretation should be given considerable weight.147 A court should give 
serious consideration to all of an agency’s expository reasons (which are the 
appropriate kinds of reasons to support an agency’s understanding of the 
inherent meaning of a static text). Further,  the special insight that the author 
possesses given its authorship of the underlying regulation should be considered 
as an expository reason that warrants epistemological deference.148 There is no 
logical justification for an agency to exercise its purported policymaking 
strengths in this purely interpretive endeavor. Instead, the policymaking 
strengths, as reflected in prescriptive arguments, are expected to be exercised 
when an agency fills gaps in an ambiguous text to promulgate a legislative rule 
since there is an absence of already-made law. 
Problems critics have with modern Auer deference—such as self-delegation, 
unclear regulations, and unfair surprise—stem from the separation of the 
doctrine from its historical roots,149 and its subsequent connection with a 
Chevron-inspired view of interpretation as an exercise of delegated power to fill 
gaps. If the doctrine was returned to its original understanding, the limitations 
placed on the modern Auer doctrine can be viewed as denying deference in 
situations in which the reviewing court is likely to have found the agency to be 
an unreliable source of what the regulation meant.150 For example, when an 
                                                          
 146 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984) 
(The court has “long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and 
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”). 
 147 Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 148 A reviewing court should also other consider pre-promulgation materials. Sources 
that can aid a reviewing court to discern the original meaning of an agency’s regulation 
include (a) the statement of basis and purpose (Noah calls this the final preamble), (b) 
regulatory analyses, and (c) other published documents. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory 
Intent: The Place for a Legislative History of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 260 
(2000) (“This Article juxtaposes the contrasting judicial approaches to the interpretation of 
statutes and regulations in order to suggest that the courts have got it backwards when they 
largely ignore an agency’s original intent in promulgating a legislative rule.”). 
 149 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 97. 
 150 Id. (replacing categorical deference with epistemological deference means that an 
agency is not given the power of self-delegation. The court holds ultimate authority to 
determine the meaning of an ambiguous regulation with the agency’s interpretation likely to 
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agency promulgates a regulation that parrots the statute,151 the reliability of the 
agency’s interpretation can be questioned since the agency is not the author of 
the interpreted text.152   When an agency’s interpretation of a regulation creates 
an unfair surprise,153 this raises concerns about the reliability of current agency 
in understanding the original, inherent meaning of the regulation.154 Further, 
proper use of an interpretive rule should not incorporate the current political 
considerations of the current agency to give new meaning to a regulation 
promulgated by a previous agency and administration. Flip-flops in interpretive 
rules raise exactly this suspicion. Pojanowski concludes that “[i]n fact, by 
withholding Auer deference in the context of parroting regulations and unfair 
surprise, the Court, as a practical matter, is already backing into its original 
approach to Seminole Rock.”155 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
The APA distinguished between two types of rulemakings, an interpretive 
rule, which is an interpretive effort intended to clarify existing law and a 
legislative rule, which is the policymaking effort intended to create new law.156 
Chevron blurred the conceptual difference between these two efforts in the case 
of an agency delegated interpretive power to resolve statutory ambiguities. 
However, while “Chevron does not make agency ‘interpretation’ of statutes 
binding on the courts, it does require acceptance of agency lawmaking.”157 
Courts should retain ultimate interpretive power to clarify a decision that 
Congress made in Chevron cases. If a case proceeds to step two, the deference 
                                                          
be given considerably weight when determined by the court to be a reliable source of 
meaning). 
 151 Gonzales v Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special 
authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to 
formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). 
 152 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 98. 
 153 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156, 158 (2012). 
 154 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 95. 
 155 Id. at 99. 
 156 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (“The 
Administrative Act (APA) establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use for 
‘rule making,’ defined as the process of “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”); 5 
U.S.C. § 551(5). The APA distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called “legislative 
rules” are issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, see §§ 553(b), (c); and have the 
“force and effect of law,” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979). 
“Interpretive rules,” by contrast, are “issued . . . to advise the public of the agency’s 
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers,” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial 
Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995), do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking, and “do 
not have the force and effect of law.” Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1201-02. 
 157 Herz, supra note 25, at 187 n.3, 190. 
2019] Auer Deference Should Be Dead; Long Live Seminole Rock 101 
step, courts must ensure that the reasoned decision-making requirement is 
satisfied. If an agency uses expository reasoning to justify its interpretation of a 
statutory ambiguity, it does not deserve categorical deference but should instead 
be considered for epistemological deference. In fact, any interpretive effort by 
an agency, whether of a statute or a regulation, should not be a candidate for 
categorical deference. If resolving legal uncertainty requires technical and 
political choices, rather than legal craft, then an agency’s interpretive effort, 
which should correctly be called a legislative effort, should be a candidate for 
categorical deference. For such a rule, there is no role for modern Auer 
deference, only Chevron deference. Unfortunately, a failure to distinguish the 
mode of reasoning an agency uses has led to a failure to follow the instructions 
Congress provided. This is true in general of the APA and specifically in its 
statutory commands to a specific administrative agency. 
Although while it might appear that the theory underlying the models for 
Chevron deference and Auer deference are similar, they are fundamentally 
different. Chevron deference involves agencies, using their superior subject 
matter expertise (compared to courts) and congressionally delegated authority to 
fill gaps in the statute by making law in the form of legislative rules. In this 
scenario, Chevron calls upon courts to give categorical deference to the agency’s 
statutory interpretation, which should be expressed through prescriptive 
reasoning. Auer deference involves agencies, using their special insight into 
understanding the intentions of the promulgator of the regulation, that is, the 
agency itself, should be viewed as a convincing source of what an ambiguous 
regulation actually means. The agency presents its understanding of the 
legislative rule, expressed using expository reasoning and in the form of 
interpretive rules, which warrant epistemological consideration from the 
reviewing court. Relying on prescriptive reasons to clarify the meaning of an 
existing legislative rule is irrational. 
This conception of interpretation requires reviewing courts to distinguish 
between interpretation and policymaking. This implies that, in practice, there are 
some interpretive questions, ambiguous but not indeterminate, that can be 
resolved using law finding skills (i.e., legal craft) while others require 
lawmaking or policymaking skills. Agencies, by the expression of the actual 
kinds of reasons they provide for their interpretive choice and by what they say 
they are attempting to achieve with the interpretive choice, warrant 
epistemological deference (i.e., Skidmore deference) for regulatory 
interpretation questions and categorical deference for statutory interpretation 
questions that are supported by prescriptive reasoning. There is neither any place 
for nor theoretical justification for Auer deference. Agency interpretive rules 
should be subject to a lesser form of deference which matches the original 
concept of Seminole Rock deference. 
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